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Summary findings
Basu, Bell, and Bose analyze the example of a landlord, a  The main result is that if a "passive" principal - one
moneylender, and a tenant  (the landlord  having access to  whose decisions are limited to exercising his property
finance on the same terms as the moneylender).  rights to determine his share of returns - is the first
It is natural to assume that the landlord  has first claim  mover, allocative efficiency is impaired unless his
on the tenant's output  (as a rule, If  they live in the same  equilibrium payoffs are uniform across states of nature.
village, he may have some say in when the crop is  The limited liability of the tenant creates the strict
harvested). The moneylender is more of an outsider, not  superiority of interlinkage by making uniform rents
well placed to exercise such a claim. A landless, assetless  nonoptimal when, with noncollusive principals, the
tenant will typically not get a loan unless he has a  landlord  (the passive principal) is the first mover. A
tenancy. Without interlinkage, the landlord is likely to  change in seniority of claims from the first to tlhe second
move first.  mover (the moneylender) further strengthens this result.
In the noncooperative sequential game where the  But uniform payoffs for the first mover are not essential
landlord is the first mover and also enjoys seniority of  for allocative efficiency if he is the only principal with a
claims if the tenant defaults, interlinkage is superior,  continuously variable instrument of control. So, the main
even if contracts are nonli  near - a result unchanged  result is sensitive to changes in the order of play but not
with the incorporation  of moral hazard.  to changes in the priority of claims.
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Corresponding author1. Introduction
The central idea in the literature on interlinking is a simple one: if one principal acquires
all instruments, then with transferable utility, he can do at least as well as any set of principals
among whom all instruments are distributed and who act non-cooperatively. To take the well-
worn example of a landlord, a moneylender and a tenant, let the landlord have access to finance
on the same terms as the moneylender. Then he always has the option of offering an interlinked
tenancy-cum-credit contract whose terms are identical to  those  of the contracts that are the
outcome of  the  game  involving the  landlord and  moneylender as  separate principals.  The
question that arises at once is: can the landlord do strictly better? It  is far  from a foregone
conclusion that he can. To give three very different instances in which he cannot, consider first
the case where there is no uncertainty and the tenant is subject to unlimited liability (Bhadhuri,
1973). Then, as Newbery (1975) shows, a first-best allocation in which the landlord enjoys the
entire surplus can be achieved through the use of a single instrument. Secondly, in a uncertain
world in which enough variables are observable, Ray and Sengupta (1989) show that, given a
particular set of conditions, a landlord can do just as well by shunning moneylending provided
he can impose sufficiently nonlinear contracts. Thirdly, if the setting is one of adverse selection,
in which tenants'  discount rates are their private information, then only the more impatient
among them will take up interlinked contracts, which also involve departures from the first-best
allocation (Banerji, 1995).
The purpose of this paper is to show that there are potential gains from coordination
through interlinking even in circumstances that seem, at first sight, rather unpromising. Thus, in2
establishing  the main result, we rule out any moral hazard by denying the tenant any choices
other than  whether  to accept  a contract.'  We also assume  that the landlord  can costlessly  observe
the output from  the tenancy,  so that depending  on the other information  available  to him, he can
specify  either  state- or output-contingent  payments.  Although  we do not confine  our attention  to
the case  where  the tenant  is risk neutral,  we begin with it in order  to sharpen  the argument;  for in
this case, risk-sharing  has no role to play. All this contrasts  with the standard explanations  of
interlinkage  which rely on moral hazard or the absence of nonlinear pricing (see Bell, 1988,
for discussion).
In our model, the occurrence  of interlinkage  is basically driven by the assumption  of
limited liability.  Irndeed  the model may be viewed as demonstrating  the power of limited
liability. While this assumption  has not been used too widely in the theoretical literature  on
agrarian  organization  (for its use in the context of tenancy, see Kotwal, 1985; Basu, 1992),  it
is empirically  very robust in backward  agrarian  economies. In the event of a crop failure due
to a drought or a flood, it is the norm rather than the exception for the principal to forego
some of the contractual  claims that he or she may have on the agent (Atchi Reddy, 1996;
Jones, 1962).
When,  as is plausible,  the realized  output  can be so small as to make it impossible  for the
tenant to meet his contractual  obligations,  it is the provisions  for default that have a central
place, especially  when there are two principals  who act non-cooperatively.  For the contractual
terms cannot  be spec  ified  without  a clear rule to settle  what are competing  claims  in the event of
1  It will be recalled  that moral  hazard  is the cause  of interlinkage  in the model  of Braverman  and Stiglitz  (1981).3
a default. In the present setting, it is natural to assume that the landlord has first claim on the
tenant's output. As a rule, he lives in the same village, he may have some say in when the crop is
harvested, and if the rent depends on the level of output, the crop is usually harvested and
threshed under his watchful eye. The moneylender, however, is often an outsider, who is far
worse placed to exercise such a claim. Turning to the question of the sequence of moves, note
that  a  landless and  assetless tenant  will typically not  get a  loan unless he  has a  tenancy.
Consequently, we assume that in the absence of interlinkage, the landlord will move first, and
that  there  will  be  a  sequential  (Stackelberg)  game,  with  the  landlord  as  leader.  For
completeness, however, the robustness of our results to  the relaxation of these assumptions
involving the sequence of moves and the seniority of claims is examined in section 6.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The basic model, in which all players are risk neutral
and  there  is  effectively full  observability, is  set  out  in  section 2.  Under  interlinking, the
landlord's optimum therefore entails a first-best allocation, a well known result that is proved in
section 3. The sequential game with both principals is analyzed in section 4, where it is shown
that a first-best allocation is possible if and only if the landlord is able to specify a fixed rent
independently  of  the  state  of  nature  without  violating  the  tenant's  individual rationality
constraint. This will be feasible only if output in the worst state of nature is sufficiently high;
otherwise, interlinkage will be advantageous. Here, it should be noted that in our model, the
landlord can write contracts which are state-contingent but not ones which are contingent on the
amount of credit taken. This latter is a crucial assumption, but we feel it is quite reasonable to
assume that the volume of credit taken is not observable to third parties outside the borrower and4
the lender. In section 5, we examine the question of risk-sharing when the tenant is risk averse.
Interlinking permits the attainment of a first-best allocation, in which the landlord bears all risks.
It is shown, however, that in the absence of interlinkage, if the effort of the tenant is not variable,
there  exists  no  Nash-Stackelberg  equilibrium  in  which  the  landlord  absorbs  all  risks.
Consequently, no equilibrium of the sequential game can be allocatively efficient in this case.
We then extend our analysis to include moral hazard, which arises when the tenant's  effort is
variable and it is prohibitively costly to observe or monitor it.  Our conclusion here is identical
to that of section 4: there are gains to interlinking if the landlord does not charge a uniform rent.
As a second generalization, section 6 examines the effects of changes in the order of play, and of
the  transfer of  seniority of  claims  to  the  moneylender. The paper  concludes with  a  brief
discussion.
2.  The Model
The tenant-cultivator is assumed to apply his endowment of an indivisible unit of labor
to a plot of land.  The output produced is stochastic, with two possible outcomes: a high yield
(denoted by y),  and a bad harvest, or low yield (denoted by yL). The probability of the good
outcome is an increasing, strictly concave and twice differentiable function of K, 7r(K),  where K
is the amount of investment in non-labor inputs inputs, with  r'(K) > 0 and 7e"(K)  < 0.  We
additionally assume  that  7r(K) satisfies both  Inada  conditions,  i.e.  limKO07r'(K)  =  +c*  and
limK,+,r'(K) = 0, to ensure the existence of interior solutions.
There is only one  landowner in the village from whom  a plot can be  rented.  It  is5
assumed that he can observe the outcome, and so make the rent contingent thereon. Let O;  be the
rent in state i (i = H,L). Lacking any funds of his own, the tenant must borrow to finance K, the
use of which the lender can observe. If the landlord has access to funds, he may offer credit on
terms which are interlinked with the rental agreement.  If he does not, or chooses not to lend,
then the source of the loan is a professional moneylender. The opportunity cost of funds is the
same for the landlord and the moneylender, and is a constant (1 + m) per dollar loaned.
All three agents are assumed to be risk neutral.  The reservation income of the tenant
is y,  which is assumed to be perfectly certain.  The investment in inputs is made essential for
participation in cultivation by assuming that 7(O)  = 0 and y > yL.
If the output produced by the tenant is less than the combined amounts of the rent and
credit obligations, there will be a shortfall in repayment of dues.  The question arises as to how
this shortfall will be shared.  As indicated in the Introduction, we assume that the landlord has
the "first rights" to the harvest, due to either the nature of property rights in the countryside, or
his greater power and proximity to the tenancy, and thus eliminate the possibility of situations
which  involve bargaining strategies.  With this assumption, it is easy to see that we  do not
sacrifice any generality by confining our attention to those rental contracts where ;i < yi, for i =
L, H; for demanding a state-contingent rent that is larger than the output in that state is pointless
whatever be the landlord's bargaining power. It is also assumed that the monopoly power of the
lender (or the landlord-cum-lender) over the tenant enables him to offer "all-or-nothing" loans
which specify both the rate of interest and the amount of the loan.
We analyze the landlord's optimum under interlinkage first, and then compare it to the6
outcomes when the landlord and the moneylender make separate and independent decisions.
From this comparison, we establish the conditions under which the interlinking of the land and
the credit markets leads to allocations that cannot be reproduced when the landlord and the
moneylender play non-cooperatively. In the latter case, we assume that the tenant contracts with
the moneylender after he has accepted the terms of the rent as specified by the landlord.  This is
a  realistic assumption, which naturally makes the landlord a  first  mover, and the  lender a
follower, in the sequential game that is developed in section 4.
3.  The Optimal Interlinked Contract
When the landlord offers interlinked loans, the terms of payment for both the land and
the loan can be subsumed under a contract that appropriately specifies the state-contingent dues
PL and PH'  together with the amount of funds advanced to the tenant.  The optimal values of
these variables can be derived from the following program:
Maximize  [nr(K)13H  + (1 -2t(K))PL  -(1 +m)K]  (1)
3 L  I'H, K
subject to the tenant's participation constraint
7g(K)(YH - PH) +  (1  - 2(K))(YL - 1L) 2 y  (2)
It is assumed that there exists a solution involving non-negative values of PH, OL,,  and K such that7
the landlord's expected income is positive. 2 It is clear that (2) will be binding at the optimum, 1¾
and 1L  being lump-sum transfer instruments.  Hence, the objective function of the landlord can
be expressed as
7r(K)yH  + (1  - 7t(K))yL  - (1 +m)K - y.
The assumptions on rr(.) ensure that there is an interior solution with respect to K, given by the
associated first-order condition
n'(K)[YH  -YL]  = 1 + m,  (3)
Let the optimal value of K be denoted by K°, where it should be noted that K° is the amount of
investmnent  that maximizes the expected output net of the opportunity cost of producing it, and is
independent of the amount of rent.  Substituting for K° in (2), and recalling that (2) is strictly
binding in the optimal solution and that 0 < ,B;  < yi, it is seen that with y > 0, any pair (131,)  in
the non-negative region of the line segment so described will, together with K°, induce a fully
efficient allocation of resources. 3
4. A Separate Moneylender
2  We assume that the landlord  and the moneylender  do not supplement  the eamings of the tenant, and earn
negative  payoffs,  in any state of nature. For$implicity,  we regard  yH  and  YL suitably  high  to ensure  the existence
of interior solutions  involving  non-negative  ,, and R,,  for i =L, H, in all cases.
3  We assume  that y  is sufficiently  low  to make  non-negative  rents feasible. Note that if y = 0, the (unique)
optimal  rents are given by P,i  = y;.8
We now consider  the alternative  situation  where  the tenant  borrows  the necessary  funds
from a separate,  monopolistic  moneylender  following  the rental  agreement  with the landlord. In
the sequential  game to be analyzed,  the lender  moves second,  and chooses  the size of the loan,
and the state-contingent  terms of repayment  RH  and RL,  as the best responses  to (pH,  PL)  chosen
by the landlord,  so as to extract  any remaining surplus from the tenant. The moneylender's
program  can be represented  as
Maximize  {7r(K)min(RH,  yH - PH) + (1 - 7r(K))min(RL,  YL  - PL) - (I + m)K}  (4)
{RH, RL, K}
subject  to the tenant's participation  constraint,  which  takes  the form
1r(K)(yH-N3H)+(l-7R(K))(yL-031)  - {n(K)min(RH,  yHPH)+(l--n(K))min(RL,  yLPL)}  > Y  (5)
Noting  that the participation  constraint  of the tenant  will bind at the optimum,  inspection  of (4)
and (5) reveals  that the problem  of the moneylender  reduces  to maximizing  the residual  surplus
after  the claims  of the other  parties  have  been  satisfied. That is, he chooses  K in order  to
Maximize {[n(K)(yH  - DI3  + (1 - 7r(K))(yL  - PL) - (1 + m)K] - y }  (6)
K
The associated  first-order  condition  is
n(K)[YH  - YL)  - (PH  - 3L)]  1  +m.  (7)
Let K' represent  the optimal  choice  of the moneylender. K'  will be the solution  to (7) as long
as
nt(K7)(YH - PH)  + (1 - n(K7))(yL - PL)  - (1 + m)K  2  y,9
i.e., the lender's resulting payoff (subject to  the satisfaction of the  tenant's participation
constraint)  is non-negative. Otherwise,  K'  = O.'  Provided  that PH  and ,BL  are not so high as to
render  lending  activities  unprofitable,  it is clear from (7) that K' will depend  on the terms  of the
rental  contract,  being a decreasing  function  of AP  - ,H  - PL. As is evident  from (3) and (7),  K7 m
K°,  except  in the case  where  the rent is independent  of the state of nature  (i.e.,  PH=PL).
Now, not only is a uniform  rent both necessary  and sufficient  to induce the lender  to
advance  a loan of K°, but it will also be optimal from the landlord's point of view if it can be
chosen such that the moneylender  and the tenant obtain exactly  their reservation  alternatives
(1+m)K°  and y respectively.  This is the case if there exists  a P°  E (0, yL]  that satisfies
7r(K")YH  + (1 - I(K"))YL  - (1 + m)K  --  y  = 0.  (8)
The lender's best response  is to choose  RH  and RL  such  that
71(K")[min{RH,  yH  - PO}]  + (1 -7t(K))[min{RL,  YL-  A]  = (1 + m)K
Such  an outcome,  if it exists,  is fully  efficient,  so that there  will be no gains  from interlinking  in
this case. 5
4  This is so in the sense of the reservation  payoff  of the moneylender  (net of the opportunity  cost of funds)
being zero.
S A higher  uniform  rent is infeasible,  given that  the participation  of the lender  is essential  for production  by
virtue of the assumption that 7r(O)  = 0.10
If, however, the 130  that solves (8) has the property that ,B°  > YL,  such a unifonn rent is
infeasible, and the landlord's optimum involves rents that differ across the states of nature.  As
demonstrated in the appendix, it will be optirnal for the landlord to appropriate the entire output
when the yield is low (i.e., 
1 L  =  YL), and PH will be strictly greater than PL* It follows at once
from (7) that Km < K", so that the outcome in the sequential game is inefficient (in the sense of
production efficiency) and there will be gains from interlinkage. This is likely in practice, for
droughts, floods and pestilence ensure that the value of yL  is small.
A special case, where it is always in the landlord's interest to offer an interlinked deal,
occurs if YL  =  0,  that is, the bad outcome is associated with no output.  This case yields our
result with particular transparenc,y. Since P 3L = RL  = 0, we may denote 
1 H by 1,  RH  by R and YH
by y without risk of confusion.
Once 3  is known, the moneylender's problem is to choose R and K so as to maximize
[XK(K)  min {R,  y - f3}  - (1 + m)K] such that ir(K)(y  - ,B  - R) 2  Y.  Since y  2  0, the constraint
requires y - P >  R.  Hence, the maximand can be simplified accordingly and we get the first-
order condition
1+m
7'  (K)  = 
1+m.
Since efficiency requires 7r'(K)  =  -,  inefficiency occurs whenever P > 0.
Given  that thLe  landlord moves first,  his problem is to  choose 1 so as to  maximize11
1+m
7r(K)13,  keeping in mind that K is implicitly defined by 2r'(K) =  . It is immediately
evident that the chosen value of 1  exceeds zero.  It follows that if the landlord displaces the
moneylender by offering interlinked contracts to his tenant, he will do better.
The results of the preceding analysis are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1:  Given the asumptions of Section 2, the sequential game between the landlord
and the moneylender, where the landlord is the  first mover and has 'first rights " to the tenant's
harvest, yields the  following outcome:
(i)  8 3L = min(,J0, yL}, where ,80 is defined  by (8).
(ii) If/30 is strictly greater than yL, the nature of the tenant 's "limited liability " makes it
optimalfor the landlord to charge non-uniform rents, with
/3H> f38L  = yL.
Interlinkage results in a higher expected  yield, and a higher payoff to the landlord, in
this case.
Proof:  The proof  of (i) is provided  in the appendix.  To show  that  BH  > 
1 L = YL  when  P° > YL,
consider the effect of an increase in *BH  on the landlord's expected payoff.  Let
Q(K;  PH, PL)  7r(K)13H  + [1 - 7r(K)]3L  (9)
Then,12
QK(K;  IH' 1L)  =  7'1(K)(PH - IL) OK  + z(K)  (10)
from which it followrs  that QK(K;  YL, YL) > 0.  By part (i), f3 > YL  implies that  .L  = YL. Clearly,
in this  case, a  small  increase in  .BH  from the uniform  rent  of  YL' while  not  violating  the
participation constraints in the ensuing subgame, would result in an expected payoff which is
strictly greater than yL. Thus, the optimal rents are non-uniform, with  iH  strictly greater than
BL.  As discussed earlier, this results in Km < K°, which proves the rest of part (ii).  1/
It  is important to  stress that if the equilibrium in the sequential game involves non-
uniform rents, the participation constraint of the moneylender need not necessarily bind.  In the
situation corresponding to part (ii) of Proposition 1, let (f3max,  YL)  be the pair of state-contingent
rents such that, with K being given by (7), the participation constraint of the lender is binding.
As  long  as 
1 H  is  slrictly less than  Hma, increases in  I  above  YL decrease the amount of
investment. 6 Clearly, it is possible for N',  the interior solution to  0,  O to be strictly less
than  PH',  in  which  case  the  moneylender  chooses  N3  as  the  optimal  rent,  and  the
moneylender's equilibrium payoff will be strictly positive.
Equations (3) and (7) reflect the fundamental difference between the incentives of the
landlord and  the moneylender with  respect to  advancing credit  to  the tenant.  Since, under
6  In this case,  there is an interior  solution  to the moneylender's  program. His optimal  choice  of K is given by
(7), from which it is easy  to derive d  =  "  f,)  < 0.13
interlinkage,  the landlord  receives  the entire  output  (and  therefore  any  increase  therein)  net of y,
the L.H.S.  of (3) represents  the change  in both the expected  output  and the landlord's  payoff  that
results  from an increment  in K. If 
1H is strictly  greater  than  ,L'  it follows  from (7) that the tenant
will obtain  a smaller  loan  in the absence  of interlinkage.  This is because  the independent  lender
does not get the entire increase  in the expected  yield.  In fact, with the lender receiving  the
residual  surplus  after the rent has been appropriated  by the landowner,  an increase  in K, while
raising 2t(K),  also increases  the "leakage" (in the form of the higher expected rent) from the
residual  that is available  to the lender  (over  and above  the reservation  income  of the tenant). As
evident  from (7),  an increase  in A4  increases  the leakage  to the landlord,  and reduces  the optimal
size of the moneylender's  loan.
Observe  that while we allow  the landlord  and the moneylender  to write state-contingent
contracts,  we do not allow  the former  to write a contract  contingent  on the amount  borrowed  by
the peasant. If we did allow  such contracts,  the landlord  would  specify  two fimctions  PH(K)  and
3(K),  which  denote  the state-and  -loan  contingent  rents,  such  that




where AH  and  AL  are non-negative amounts that satisfy AH+AL= (I + m)K0 .For all other K,
the landlord punishes the lender by charging a high  enough rent (one which extracts all the
output, say).  This makes any amount of credit, other than the one that is optimal from the
landlord's  point of view, infeasible.  On the other hand, the participation constraints of the
moneylender and the tenant bind  with  a loan of size K°.  Thus,  Pji(K)  as specified  above,
together with R 1 = (1 + m)K° for i - L, H, and K = K°, constitute a sequential equilibrium
which produces a first-best outcome even in the absence of interlinkage.
Viewed  in  this  manner,  our  model  may  be  interpreted  as  one  that  demonstrates
interlinkage to be a consequence of the landlord's inability to make the rents contingent on the
volume of loan when there is a  separate moneylender.  In this connection, we would like to
argue that the volume of loan is typically unobservable. In collecting field data, it is well known
that credit information is very hard to get, since it is such an intangible transaction.  Moreover,
in our model the value of K cannot be deduced from output, since output is unaffected by K.
This point carries over  to  cases where K affects the volume  of output, but  there are other
unobservable inputs (such as the tenant's effort) as well.
To conclude this section, it should be evident from (4) - (6) that if the lender is unable to
observe the state of nature, and so must stipulate a uniform interest rate, then all of the above
argument goes through as before.  The tenant's  limited liability simply implies that the lender
may be unable to collect the entire amount of the principal plus the interest in the bad state.
5. Risk-Sharing and Moral Hazard15
If the tenant is risk  averse, or his effort is prohibitively costly to  monitor, then the
sharing of risk and the provision of incentives, respectively, become central considerations in the
determination of the contractual terms.  Since the state-contingent payments cease, in general, to
operate as lump-sum transfer instruments in  this  case, one might  expect coordination over
instruments through interlinkage to offer advantages over independent deals under a wider range
of conditions than those described in Proposition 1. We begin by demonstrating that this indeed
so in the case of a risk-averse tenant, even when his effort is not variable.
The tenant is assumed to have preferences over lotteries that can be represented by the
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(x) for a risk-averse agent, where x denotes his
realized income. Thus, the participation constraint becomes
2t(K)U(YH  - PH) + (1 - 7u(K))U(YL  - PL) 2 U( Y).  (11
Suppose, as in Section 3, the landlord is in a position to impose an interlinked contract.
Replacing (2) by (11) in the landlord's problem when there is interlinkage yields the same first-
order condition with respect to K, equation (3), as before.  Those associated with Pi  (i = H, L)
yield YH  - PH =  YL - PL, that is, we have the standard result that the tenant receives a fixed
payment  y,  with the landlord bearing all risk, a  result that holds for  any value of K. The
allocation is fully efficient, as expected.
Matters are otherwise in the absence of interlinking.  We can, indeed, go further than in
Proposition 1.16
Proposition 2:  If the tenant is risk averse, then in any equilibrium of the sequential game in
which an independent moneylender moves second, the tenant will bear some some risk  Hence,
the associated allocation is always less efficient than that under interlinkage.
Proof:  Since the tenant's only means of repaying a loan is his income from cultivation, he will
bear no risk if and only if
YH  -OH  YL  - OL>  RH=  RL  (12)
Suppose, therefore, thart  the landlord pays the tenant the fixed sum w.  If the tenant is to bear no
risk, the loan contract must take the form of a fixed repayment R that is feasible in both states of
nature. Thus, the lender's problem is
Maximize [R - (1 + m)K]  (13)
{R,Klw}
subject to the participation constraint
w-R2  y.  (14)
If (14) is satisfied, then so is (12), with w = YH - OH  =  YL - PL. It is clear that there can be no
equilibrium  in  which  the  lender  participates  unless  w  >  y.  If  w  >  y,  however,  the17
moneylender's problem has the solution K = 0 and R = w - y.  Since the lender moves second,
there is nothing the landlord can do to avoid such an outcome. Given the assumptions 7t(O)  = 0
and  Y > YL,  there will, moreover, be a positive lower limit on K such that the landlord finds it
profitable to offer a tenancy.  It follows that the sequential game will not possess an equilibrium
if the landlord absorbs all the risks of production. If there does exist an equilibrium, therefore, its
associated allocation of resources will be inefficient.
11
It should be emphasized that in this setting, there will be with gains from the interlinking
of contracts even without an appeal to the infeasibility of uniform rental payments when the bad
outcome is a sufficiently miserable level of output, as is necessary when the tenant is risk-neutral
(see Proposition 1).
To complete this section, we introduce moral hazard by assuming that observing and
monitoring the tenant's  effort, e, is now prohibitively costly.  We initially continue with the
assumptions of the indivisibility of e, and a production technology that requires that land and
labor be  employed  in  fixed proportions.  Thus, the tenant's  choice  is confined to  the two
alternatives of applying one indivisible unit of effort, or none at all, to the given unit of land.
Our results are then extended to the case where the tenant may choose among all non-negative
levels of e.
Specifically, we suppose that effort, as well as K, now has a  positive effect on the
probability of producing the higher level of output that is represented in the following manner18
07r(K) if e=1
7c(K,  e) =  (15)
t0  if e=O
where 7r(K)  has the same properties as in the previous section.  Let x; be the tenant's income in
state i.  For simplicity of exposition, the tenant's utility function is assumed to be separable in xi
and e, and is represented as
V(xY.,  e) = u(x 1) - e
where u(x,) is concave and twice differentiable in its argument.  The reservation utility of the
tenant is u (= u(-y)).  After entering into all the necessary contractual agreements, the tenant
chooses e E  {O, 1  } to
maximize {fx(K,  e)u(x,) + (1 - ir(K, e))u(xL) - el
provided that, with this optimal choice, his expected utility from participation is no less than u .
Since he  is the player who moves  last of all, his  state-contingent payoffs  are the residual
amounts that are left after the claims of the decision-maker in the previous stage of the game
have been satisfied.  Irrespective of the identity of the penultimate player, the xi's that induce
unit effort from the tenant must satisfy the following participation and incentive compatibility
conditions19
7r(K)U(XH)  +  (1 -ir(K))u(xL)  -I  > U:  (16a)
2t(K)U(XH)  + (1 - 7a(K))U(XL)  - 1 > u(xL)  (16b)
Following fairly standard arguments, it is easy to see that, provided e =  1 is desirable for the
penultimate player, (1  6a) and (1  6b) will bind at his optimum, whereupon the solution values, xH
and XL*, satisfy u(xH*)  =  U + [7r(K)]', and u(xL*)  =  U.
The landlord-cum-moneylender will choose 1 H' ,L  and K, such that Di  = y; - x; for i = H,
L, and K maximizes
7(K)[YH  - XH*] + (1  - 7t(K))[yL  - xL] - (1  +  m)K
Keeping in mind that XH depends on K, the first-order condition for an interior solution is
7t'(K)[(YH  - YL) - X  - X*  +  -r  ()  (1+M)  =0  (17)
,n(K)u  (XH)  (7
An important special case is one where the tenant is risk neutral, so that V(.) specializes
to V(x,, e) = x, - e.  The fact that (16b) is binding in the optimal solution then yields
7r(K)  (XH* - XL)  =  1
Consequently, (17) becomes identical to the corresponding first-order condition (3) in Section 3
which yields K° as the optimal interlinked loan. With risk aversion, however, the optimal K that
is derived from (17) will be  strictly less than K°: the compromise between risk-sharing and20
incentives takes a toll on efficiency.
The absence of interlinkage causes a further deterioration of allocative efficiency, unless
the landlord is able to extract all surplus by charging a uniform rent.  To show this, let K* satisfy
(17), and let P* be such that
7c(K*  I[YH  - XH*] +  (1  - 7E(K*))[YL  -XL]  - * - (1 + m)K*  = 0.  (18)
If P* is strictly greater than YL,  then following the procedure of the previous section, it is easy to
show that the landlord will find it optimal to charge  H  >  3L*  This distorts the returns to the
moneylender, net of the payments of XH*  and XL, and results in the latter providing an amount of
funds lower than K*.  Observe that if the tenant is risk neutral, the incentive problem can be
solved without reference to risk-sharing, so that we are back in the world of sections 3 and 4,
where Proposition 1 hlolds.
For a brief demonstration of the robustness of our results when the tenant may choose
any e  E  [0, +co), we proceed in a manner similar to Grossman and Hart (1983).  That is, we
suppose that the penultimate player first determines his minimum cost (in terms of the expected
amount of residual output that the contract leaves to the tenant) of inducing a particular level of
effort from the tenant for any given K.  This yields the cost function C(e, K).  He then finds the
levels of induced effort and the size of the loan that maximize his expected payoff, net of the
total costs (1 + m)K and C(e, K).  Accordingly, the penultimate player chooses xH  and XL, given
K, to21
Minimize {7r(K,  e)xH  + (1 -7n(K,  e))xL}  (19)
subject to the tenant's participation constraint
7r(K,  e)u(x,Q + (I  - 7r(K,  e))u(xL) -e 2  u-  (20)
and her incentive compatibility constraint
e e argmax{tn(K,  e')u(xQ)  + (1 -nr(K,  e'))u(xL)  - e'}  (21)
Under the assumptions of strict concavity of u(.) and 2t(..) with respect to their arguments, the
minimization program (19) -(21) will yield x<*(e,  K) as the unique optimal solution, when
C(e, K) = ,(K, e)xH'(e,  K) + (1 - ir(K, e))xL*(e,  K)
The cost function C(e, K) will be the same whether the player concerned be the landlord (with
interlinkage) or the moneylender (as in the sequential game of Section 4).  The difference lies in
the nature of the benefit function of the penultimate player (i.e. his payoff net of (l+m)K  but
gross of C(e, K)). In the case of an interlinked contract, this player is the landlord, who provides
the loan and appropriates the surplus from the tenant.  His benefit function is
B' (e, K) = 7(e, K)y 1 H  + (1 -7a(e,  K))YL  - (1 + m)K  (22)
and he can be regarded as choosing e and K to maximize B'  (e, K) - C(e, K).  Let e° and K°22
represent the  amount  of  inputs  that  are  optimal  from the  landlord's  point  of  view  under
interlinkage.  Once iLhese  are determined, his optimal state-contingent rents follow from the
corresponding  values of xi*  = xY(e 0, K°), and from the relationship x; = yi - ,B;  for i = L, H.
The procedure  for  uncovering the  equilibrium  decisions in  the  sequential game  is
similar, except that, in this case, it is the moneylender who determines the optimal e and K by
maximizing the difference between B m(e, K; H, ,L) and C(e, K), where his benefit function is
Bm(e, K; PH,  |3L)  = 7r(e,  K)(yH - PH) + (1 - 7r(e,  K))(yL - PL)  - (1 + m)K  (23)
Note that the difference between (22) and (23) is the expected rent.  In fact, we can express (23)
as
B m(e, 1K;  Pl3,  PL)  = B'(e, K) - [2t(e,  K)PH  + (1 - A(e,  K))PL]  (24)
Once again, it is evident from (24) that if the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential
game does not involve uniform rents, then a marginal increment in K, by increasing expected
rents, will result in leakages (of the same nature as described in section 4) from the incremental
payoff accruing to the moneylender. Consequently, the marginal benefit from increasing the i-th
input, given the level of the j-th input (i, j =  e, K, with i ￿  j), will be less for the moneylender
than for the landlord, i.e. Bie  (e, K) > B  (e, K) if PH  #  PL. Suppose there exist interior solutions
to the maximization programs under interlinkage and in the sequential game, that uniform rents23
are not optimal, and that the second-order (sufficiency) are satisfied.  Then, it is easy to show,
using simple comparative statics, that interlinkage results in higher levels of e, K and expected
output than the non-interlinked case.  If the uniform rent that appropriates the entire surplus at
the input levels e° and K° is feasible, it is easy to see that it will be the optimal choice of the
landlord in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the  sequential game.  Interlinkage will not
generate any additional advantage in this case.
Thus, the incorporation of moral hazard causes no change in the fundamental conclusion
of section 4.  In fact, this is true even if the agent is risk neutral. In this case, following the same
procedure as before, it can, once again, be  easily demonstrated that, if the  limited liability
condition  renders the  optimal  uniformn  rent  infeasible, interlinked contracts will  be  strictly
superior in terms of production efficiency.
6.  Extensions
The results of the previous section were established within the framework of a sequential
game where  the landlord was the  first mover, and possessed  senior claims to  output.  As
mentioned in the Introduction, we regard this formulation to be the most appropriate reflection
of reality, since (i) a landless and assetless tenant will be considered creditworthy by informal
sector moneylenders only after he comes into possession of the tenancy contract, and (ii) the
landlord's proximity to the tenant gives him the advantage of superior accessibility to the output.
Nevertheless, to complete the argument, we now examine how robust our results are to changes
in these two assumptions.  We also extend our analysis to  allow the landlord to possesses a24
variable instrument of control, and examine the consequences of such multiplicity of instruments
on allocative efficiency.  As it turns out, all these changes introduce important qualifications to
our previous results.
6.1 Changes in the Sequence of Decisions and Seniority of Claims
For the sake of brevity, we avoid a complete and formal exposition of the games that
involve alternative stipulations of seniority, together with different order of moves.  Consider
first the alternative scenario where the moneylender moves first, and has the "first rights" to the
harvest. It is easy to see that the loan contract will specify RH,  RL and K° such that K° satisfies
(3), and RH  and RL satisfy
7r(  K)(YH  - RH) + (1 - 7E(  KO))(yL-  RL) =  3  +  Y  (25)
where f represents thle landlord's reservation income from the next best use of his plot.  The
outcome is first best, and interlinkage loses its superiority in this case.
Transference of seniority of claims from the first to the second mover introduces new
complications.  Irrespective of his identity, the player who moves first can now receive payoffs
that differ from the slate-contingent claims originally specified in his contract.  To start with,
suppose that the moneylender follows the landlord in the sequence of decisions.  With the
former possessing the seniority of claims, the actual payoff received by the landlord in state i
will be given by min{J  5;, y, - R;}, for i  L, H.  Furthermore, for the equilibrium outcome of this
game to be first best, the landlord m'ust receive uniform payoffs across the states of nature.
Otherwise, as obvious from the previous analysis, the moneylender will not find it optimal to25
offer KW.  The condition that YL  be sufficiently large to enable the landlord to charge the uniform
rent J3,  where j°  satisfies (8), while still necessary, is, however, no longer sufficient to ensure
that K° constitutes the best response of the moneylender.  For a first-best outcome, I3  must,
additionally, satisfy both the following conditions
X(K°  )  00  <(26) 7E(K 0)
YL - Po  <  )  (27)
and this implies that maintaining allocative efficiency is now more demanding than it was in
section 4.  Violation of either (26) or (27) implies that, even if ,B°  '  YL,  the equilibrium payoffs
of the landlord are non-uniform across states of nature, in which case, the lender no longer finds
it optimal to provide K°,  the amount of funds that corresponds to the first-best outcome.
To see this, suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an equilibrium of this sequential
game where the landlord receives the uniform rent (or payoff) 0 (< yL), following which the
lender offers {K°, RHO,  RLO}  as the credit contract, where
yi - p > Rj°,
C(K )(YH - RH0) +  (1 - C(KW))(YL  - RL0)-13  =  Y
and the magnitude of P  is such that (26) is violated.  Clearly, satisfaction of all participation
constraints implies that  3  < p°  Consider the alternative credit contract (K°, RH, RL')  where
RHa  YH  n
and26
RL* =  YL.
Following the choice of the uniform rent ,B  by the landlord, if the lender deviates by offering (K°,
RH*,  RL), the seniority of his claims implies that the landlord obtains (3  as his payoff only when
YH  is produced.  When YL  is produced, the moneylender appropriates the entire output. Observe
that, given the tenant's limited liability, it is evident that, in state L, she earns nothing, while she
satisfies her participation constraint by earning exactly  Y  in state H.  Furthermore, since
(26) does not hold, and ,B  '  (30  ]RH is non-negative.  Consequently, (K°, RH7,  RL*)  constitutes
fesible and strictly profitable deviation by the lender.
Thus, if (26) is violated, the landlord's equilibrium payoffs cannot be uniform across the
states of nature.  A similar procedure leads to the same conclusion with respect to the violation
of condition (27). It is easy to see that if P1  is strictly less than yL, and satisfies (26) and (27), it
will be the optimal choice of the landlord, and that this is the only situation where the landlord
earns uniformn  payoffs and the equilibrium outcome is first best.  If, instead, the magnitude of (3
is such that either (30 '  YL,  or any of the conditions (26) and (27) are violated, interlinkage will
retain its superiority.
When  the  landlord  is  the  second-mover,  but  possesses  seniority  of  claims,  the
equilibrium outcome may be first best even if the moneylender's  payoffs are non-uniform.
Consider, first, the case where  ( <  y.  It will be feasible and optimal for the moneylender to
offer the contract {K 0, RHO,  RLO},  where K 0 satisfies (3), and
RL  =maX{YL  - I  (KO) ,  °}  (28)27
together with
RH'  °YH  3+max{y -(I -(K 0 ))YL,c}  (29)
ir(K0)
for some a  E (O,y - E).  Note that  {[1 - 7E(K 0)IYL  - (y - a)}  is maximized when 6  =
Hence, if (1 - Tr(K))YL <  , the moneylender can obtain the first-best optimum by choosing RLO
0,ad  1
0 =  - f +  G  -(1  ,(K0 ))YL =  0, and RHO  = YH ~  Y  ( (KO)  , and will extract the entire surplus by doing so. If, on
the other hand, (1 - T(K 0))yL >  ,B, there exists a continuum of equilibria, one for each a  E
(a 0, y - ,B), where a0 = max  -y  - (1 - 7t(K 0))yL, 0}.  In each equilibrium in the continuum, the
moneylender earns a strictly positive payoff in both states, as given by the appropriate forms of
(28) and (29). It remains the case, however, that K° is the optimal amount loaned, and that the
lender extracts all surplus. If y >  ,  therefore, interlinked contracts cease to be strictly superior.
In the case where  3  2 y, the moneylender's optimum leads to a first best outcome only
if  3  + y> (1 - 1r(K 0))yL. Let the loan contract specify
RL  tmaxYL  -Y  -7r(K0 )  if 7 ))YL  I  (30a)
O  if (I - 7t(Ko))YL  > 
0
RH'= YH  +-Y-(1-71(K ))YL  (30b)
i(K  )28
together with K° as the optimal amount of the loan.  If [1 - 1(K0)]yL>  3,  the lender's expected
payoff is
t(K 0)yH  + [1 - 7(K0)]YL  - P
and he extracts the whole surplus.  If, on the other hand, [1 - Tn(K°)]yL<  ,B, the lender can still
extract the entire surplus, although it turns out that his payoff in state L is still zero, even if RLO  is
strictly positive. This is because (1 -7t(K 0))YL  <  ,  and the participation constraint
7c(K  )YH  + [I -n(K )]L  >  13  +  Y
0
imply that 7t(K 0)(yH  -- RHO)  > y,  in which case, the choices PL =  YL  and PH  - (-  i(K  ))YL
7r(K )
constitute the best response of the landlord. Nevertheless, when  y < (1 - 2t(Ko))yL,  inspection of
(3  Oa)  reveals that the loan contract specifies a strictly positive RLO.  Otherwise, if the lender were
to specify RLO  =  0, the landlord would charge the non-negative state-contingent rents PH  =  YHI
and PL  = YL  1-  1_(K),  to the disadvantage of the moneylender.
The  remaining case  is  that  wheref  P> y,  and  (1  - 7E(KW))YL  >  ,B+ y.  Under  these
conditions, it is easy to show that the moneylender is unable to design a contract that extracts all
the surplus, and that K° is no longer optimal for him.  Consequently, the equilibrium outcome of
the sequential game where  the imoneylender is  the first  mover, and the  landlord possesses
seniority of claims, will be strictly inferior to that with interlinked contracts.
6.2 Multiple Instruments29
Suppose  now  that  each  of  the  two  principals  controls  a  continuously  variable
instrument  that  affects  expected  yield  at  the  margin.  In  particular,  in  addition  to  the
moneylender supplying K, let a  (> 0) denote a variable input, with price normalized to one,
that  is  supplied by  the  landlord.  It  has  an  increasing  effect  on  expected  output  in  the
following manner: X = n(K, a) is increasing, concave and smooth in its arguments, with n(K,
0) =  7r(0, a) = 0. We shall now demonstrate that interlinkage is strictly superior, and that this
superiority is immune to the order of moves, or the assignment of seniority of claims, in the
game with two distinct principals.
Consider, first, the optimal interlinked contract.  The landlord offering this contract
specifies K°, a°, PH  and  L  to achieve the first-best solution, subject to the participation of the
tenant.  This implies that K° and a0 maximize
it(K, a)y± + (1 -ir(K,  a))yL  - (1 + m)K - a  (31)
and that 13H  and 13L  satisfy
7r(K 0, a
0 )[yH-IPH]  + (I  - r(K 0, a0))[YL  - L]  - (1 + m)K  -a  =  y  (32)
The first-order conditions that yield K0 and a0 as interior solutions are, respectively
7K(  K0, a
0)[YH  - YL]  -(1  + m) =  0  (33)
and,
Ce(  K0, a)[YH  - YL  - 1 =  0  (34)
If non-interlinked contracts are to specify the same K and a,  it is evident that the principal
who moves first must have the  same payoffs in both  states of nature.  But then, the same
principal would have no incentive to provide a positive amount of the costly instrument under30
his control.  Consequently,  the equilibrium outcome of this game would differ from that
determnined  by the equations  (32)  - (34).
6.3 Summary
What are the implications  that emerge from the analysis  of the above subsections?  First
of all, we conclude  that with limited liability  and non-collusive  principals,  allocative  efficiency
is guaranteed  only if a single  principal  has direct  control  of all instruments  that affect  production
decisions  at the margin, and, in addition,  possesses  seniority  of claims. Second,  if a "passive"
principal  - one whose decisions  are limited to exercising  his property rights to determine  his
share of the returns - is the first-mover,  then allocative  efficiency is impaired unless his
equilibrium  payoffs  are uniform  across  states  of nature. Uniform  payoffs  for the first-mover  are,
however, not  essential for allocative efficiency if  he  is the  only principal possessing a
continuously  variable  instrument  of control. As demonstrated  above,  apart  from instances  where
j3  and (1 - 7c(K 0))yL  were "too large", the first best outcome  was achieved  with the first-mover
earning  payoffs that varied across  the states of nature. Finally, a multiplicity  of continuously
variable instruments, with at least one under the control of each principal, results in  the
unambiguous  superiority  of interlinkage,  irrespective  of the assignment  of seniority  of claims
and the order  of moves.
7. Conclusion
As noted in the  introduction,  if  a  landlord can write nonlinear contracts over a3 1
sufficiently large set of observables, and certain other conditions are fulfilled, he will gain
nothing by writing  contracts  which  interlink credit  and  land markets  (Ray  and  Sengupta,
1989).  So this  route to  explaining  interlinkage  seems,  at first  blush,  to  be  blocked.  If,
however, the landlord cannot observe the terms set by a lender, our analysis of the case where
the tenant enjoys limited liability is robust to any specification of the loan contract (non-linear or
otherwise) that maximizes the residual surplus of the independent lender, and so establishes
circumstances under  which  interlinking the  credit  and  land contracts may  lead to  superior
outcomes even if each contract can be non-linearly specified.
With the rise of new kinds of analysis, such as multi-principal models (Dixit; 1996,
1997), we expect that there will be a revival in explaining interlinkage as a form of collusive
behavior  among  principals  who  were  otherwise  engaged  in  employing  Nash  equilibrium
strategies.  While  some features of these models (such as multiple principals,  risk-aversion
and moral  hazard) were  also present in this paper, it is important to note that our analysis
differs from the multi-principal literature in two aspects: our agent, the tenant, performs only
one task,  and the division  of the  (gross) returns  from this  task  is the  outcome  of a game
between the two principals.  Thus, though the present paper belongs to the genre of multi-
principal models in a broad sense, there are important idiosyncrasies in the structure of our
model, and the specific nature and the objective of our analysis differs in many details.
In  our  model,  the  axiom  of  limited  liability  is  necessary  to  generate  negative
externalities in the absence of collusion between principals.  It is this property which, under
certain conditions, makes the landlord charge non-uniform rents, whereupon the outcome  of32
the  non-cooperative  Nash  game  suffers  from  production  inefficiency  compared  to  the
"collusive" alternative of interlinkage.  Such inefficiency may occur even when the agent is
risk-neutral. At one level, a limited liability clause may be thought of as one which sets limits
to the range of nonlinear contracts that are feasible. Viewed in this manner, what our main
result demonstrated was that within the bounds of limited liability, all externalities cannot be
internalized and so a landlord can do better by usurping the role of the moneylender as well,
thereby giving rise to interlinkage.33
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Proof of Proposition 1, part (i):
We demonstrate that 1 3L =  min{  ,B°  YL}  is the optimal choice of the landowner in the
equilibrium of the seiquential  game analyzed in section 4.  As discussed in that section,  3H  =  L
=  °O  if p°  <  YL. Consider the case where PW  > YL,  and assume, to the contrary that fL  is strictly
less than YL.  Note that, with P., = YH,  the moneylender maximizes his expected returns by
choosing K = 0, so that the tenant will not participate in production.  This implies that 
3H must
be  strictly less than  YH  in the equilibrium  of the sequential game.  Then, the participation
constraint of the moneylender is strictly binding, as otherwise it is obvious from (7) that the
landlord can increase expected profits, while avoiding any changes in Km, by increasing both
state-contingent rents by appropriately small and equal amounts.  Thus, if  JL  <  YL,  with (6)
representing the payoff of the moneylender, it follows that
7t(K  )OH + (1  - 7r(K7  ))3L= 7(K ')YH  + (1 -7r(K, ))YL  - (1 + m)K7  - (A.1)
where Kt  denotes the optimal amount of finance advanced by the moneylender in this case.
Now consider the feasibility and optimality of the landlord choosing the pair of state
contingent rents
1HYH-  (Y)  [( 1 + m)K,  + y ]  Y  H  I(Km)  (YL  13L)  (A.2)
and,
1LL  =  YL  (A.3)35
It  is  easy  to  check  that  these  rents  satisfy  the  moneylender's  and  tenant's  participation
constraints  as strict  equalities  if the  previous  decisions  of the  moneylender  (K'  and  the
corresponding interest rate) remain unchanged.  If  K '  is the optimal amount of funds loaned
by the moneylender under the new circumstances, he can do no worse than before while still
satisfying the participation constraint of the tenant.  In addition, since the hypothesis  PL  <  YL
implies that PH'  < PH  and PL'  >  PL,  it follows from (7) that K '  is strictly greater than K I
Denote 7r(Km)  as 7ri  for i = 1, 2.With the new rents, the expected payoff of the landlord
is, using (A.2) and (A.3),
720H  + (1 -7[2)l3L =7[2YH + (1  - K2)YL  - -'2[(I  + m)KI  +  (A.4)
or,
With the R.H.S. of (A.1) representing his payoff under the rents (PH.  PL),  we have
[Ir 2 H+]  + (1  +  - [RA  H  (1  - 2)L]  =  [n7 1 (YH - YL) - (1 + m)Kn  - Y ]  (A.5)
Again, using(A. 1), it is easy to show that
7EI(YH  - YL) - (1 + m)K]  - Y  = 7E22H  + (1 - n2)L  - YL  (A.6)
If  PH  and PL  are optimal rents, the R.H.S. of (A.6) must be non-negative, since, with P'>  YL,  a
uniforn  rent of YL is feasible for the landlord, and results in a strictly positive payoff to the
moneylender.  Furthermore, as demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 1 in section 3, a small
increase in PH  from the uniform rent of YL  is feasible, and would result in an expected payoff
to the landlord that is strictly greater than YL. Thus, for optimal rents, the R.H.S. of (A.6) is
strictly positive.  But then, with 7r 2 >  RI, R2PH' +  (1 - R2)PL'  is strictly greater than n 2pa  +  (1  -
2t2)L.  This is a contradiction which cannot be resolved as long as PL  <  YL  <  '.  Therefore, if
,B°  is strictly greater than yL,  then PL  =  YL, and PH  > YL-Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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